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Abstract 
Using cross-country data from the European Company Survey, we investigate the relationship 
between workplace employee representation and management perceptions of the climate of 
industrial relations, sickness/absenteeism, employee motivation, and staff retention. For a 
considerably reduced subset of the data, a fifth indicator – strike activity – is also considered 
alongside the other behavioral outcomes. From one perspective, the expression of collective 
voice through works council-type entities may be construed as largely beneficial, especially 
when compared with their counterpart union agencies either operating alone or in a dominant 
position. However, if heightened distributional struggles explain these differential outcomes in 
workplace employee representation, it should not go unremarked that the influence of formal 
collective bargaining is seemingly positive.  
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I. Introduction 
Cross-country information on the extent of workplace employee representation is sparse, and still 
less is known about its effects on behavioral and economic outcomes. But this form of worker 
participation has actively been encouraged in member states of the European Union as a matter 
of policy, based notions of industrial democracy (European Commission 2002) and helping 
companies achieve economic competitiveness under the Lisbon Strategy (ETUI 2009: Chapter 
5). The impetus behind increased worker participation in the Community is long-standing. Thus, 
Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU states that “workers or their 
representatives must, at the appropriate level, be guaranteed information and consultation in 
good time in the cases and under the conditions provided by Community law and national laws 
and practices.” Most directly, Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 11 March 2002 sets down a general framework for informing and consulting workers at 
national level (Official Journal, 2002), with Article 4 of that directive outlines practical 
arrangements for the effective information and consultation of workers.1  
Yet the legislation lays down only main principles and minimal rules, allowing member 
states wide room for maneuver. Further, despite the 2009 Recast European Works Council 
Directive (Official Journal 2009) that heralded moves toward a formal linkage between 
transnational information and consultation requirements and those at the local and national levels 
(a process that has been described as articulation), the current state of play is that worker 
participation rights at establishment/undertaking level vary considerably between member states. 
Also, movement toward systematization may have been countered by other Community 
initiatives such as the Commission’s REFIT strategy (European Commission 2013a, 2013b), 
whereby all legislation deemed no longer fit for purpose – including information and 
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consultation rights – is to be withdrawn.  Nevertheless, even if there is considerable 
heterogeneity in worker participation rights at local company and cross-border levels, and in 
board-level representation, there is undoubted movement toward consolidating the linkages 
between the various levels of worker participation (see European Commission 2015).  
Despite having reasonable knowledge of the types, if not always the prevalence, of 
workplace employee representation in member states (e.g. Fulton 2013; Synthesis Report 2007), 
cross-country quantitative evidence on the determinants and consequences of that representation 
has long been sparse. Prior to the publication of the European Company Surveys such research 
was largely confined to comparisons of Germany and Britain (Addison et al. 2000), Norway and 
the U.K. (Bryson and Dale-Olson 2008), and France and Britain (Bryson, Forth, and Laroche 
2011). With the availability of a common dataset across nations, albeit not without its own 
problems, comparative quantitative work is embarking upon a growth phase.  
In contrast, from the outset considerable attention has been accorded the economic theory 
of workplace representation, drawing in particular upon notions of exit and voice (Freeman and 
Medoff 1984). However, as we shall see, this collective voice model is equivocal, only 
predicting a clear negative relationship between union voice and quits and union voice and 
absenteeism, namely two of the five outcome indicators examined in the present inquiry. 
Broadening the model to encompass governance provides a basis for expecting a negative 
association between collective voice and strike incidence based on the improved flow of 
information between the two sides (i.e. where strikes are viewed as bargaining mistakes) while 
also implying an improvement in employee motivation. Moreover, aside from these two 
additional outcomes, given that the principal goal of the present exercise is to shed further light 
on the operation of workplace representation this more comprehensive view of the collective 
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voice model to encompass governance necessarily involves consideration of the works council as 
a potential exemplar of collective voice. That is to say, if the works council can focus on 
integrative bargaining rather than distributive bargaining the beneficial impact of voice on quits, 
absenteeism, worker motivation, and strikes is strengthened. Equally, we shall have reason to 
argue that work councils are not a datum and may be expected to be influenced by union 
organization and collective bargaining, the former negatively and the latter positively. On the 
latter issue, although there are clear indications that works council effects may be positive when 
its deliberations are anchored in a system where wages are largely determined at sectoral level, 
the picture is clouded by changes in collective bargaining which we shall also have to take into 
account. 
This brings us to our final outcome indicator, namely the quality of industrial relations. 
Good labor relations are part and parcel of the collective voice model and indeed central to its 
ability to achieve traction. But they remain un-modeled. We shall examine the correlation 
between workplace representation (as well as collective bargaining) and management 
perceptions of industrial relations quality, while having regard to the potential feedback to the 
other outcome indicators.  
 The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin with a review of the collective voice model 
that embraces each of the outcome indicators considered here along with our key workplace 
representation independent variable(s). We then offer a thumbnail sketch of the recent literature 
using the European Company Surveys, as these studies also inform the present treatment. The 
unique dataset is then described. Our empirical results are next provided for the one objective 
(strike incidence) and four subjective (industrial relations climate, sickness/absenteeism, staff 
retention, and employee motivation) outcome measures. A summary concludes. 
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II. Worker Representation: Theoretical Considerations 
The key theoretical construct in examining the effects of employee workplace representation is 
collective voice. In the collective voice model, voice is to be contrasted with exit. The latter is a 
market mechanism: faced with a divergence between desired and actual conditions at the 
workplace, the worker quits the firm to search for better employment. However, there is an 
alternative to exit. The worker may instead engage in voice, discussing with his/her employer the 
conditions that need changing without quitting the job. In the collective voice model developed 
by Freeman and Medoff (1984) voice dominates data on quits as a source of information on 
worker preferences or discontent because of on-the-job skills specific to the firm and the costs 
attaching to worker mobility and labor turnover in continuity markets. Although quit behavior 
can provide such information – either inferentially or directly via exit interviews – such 
information is likely to suffer from selection biases, problems of motivating the worker to 
disclose information, and the sheer cost of the process of trial and error in determining the 
efficacy of contract innovations. The expression of collective voice on the other hand can 
outperform individual activity for various reasons. One reason is the public goods problem of 
preference revelation. Nonrival consumption of shared working conditions and common 
workplace rules create a public goods problem of preference revelation. Without some collective 
form of organization – equated by the authors with autonomous unionism – there will be too 
little incentive for the individual to reveal his or her preferences since the actions of others may 
produce the public good at no cost to that individual. Unions collect information about the 
preferences of all workers and “aggregate” them to determine the social demand for such public 
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goods, and the substitution of average for marginal preferences and the arbitraging of worker 
preferences may be efficient in such circumstances.  
 The expression of collective voice is expected to reduce quits and absenteeism, namely 
two of the five outcome indicators examined in the present inquiry. The reduction in quits is 
expected to lower hiring and training costs and increase firm-specific investments in human 
capital. Lower quits may of course also occasion less disruption in the functioning of work 
groups. Nonetheless, apart from the reduction in quits as a result of the union providing direct 
information about worker preferences inter al., the connection between voice and performance is 
opaque in the model. Moreover, in discussing the reduction in quits, the union voice model 
appears to emphasize dissatisfaction (Freeman 1976: 367). That said, the difference in expressed 
complaints between union and nonunion labor is also interpreted as an expression of democracy 
rather than as indicating a true shortfall in satisfaction, the difference between ‘true’ and ‘voiced’ 
dissatisfaction reflecting the nature of the voice institution (Freeman and Medoff 1984: 139).2   
 The second aspect of voice is governance. The context is again the continuity of the 
employment relation. Governance refers to the policing or monitoring of incomplete employment 
contracts and thus includes the use of grievance and arbitration procedures and other 
mechanisms to mitigate what are seen as problems stemming from the authority relation. Such 
procedures should also help improve the flow of information between the two sides. Even if the 
specialized procedural arrangements typically associated with union regimes are not unique to 
those settings, a union may make it easier for the firm to negotiate and administer these practices 
(Riordan and Wachter 1983). 
 Freeman (1976: 364) and Freeman and Medoff (1984: 11) claim the union governance 
aspect of the voice model is quite consistent with the modern contracts literature, the argument 
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being that the presence of a union can facilitate long-term efficient contracting of this nature. 
They argue that a union specializing in information about the contract and in the representation 
of workers can prevent employers from engaging in opportunistic behavior. Workers may 
withhold effort and cooperation when the employer cannot credibly commit to take their interests 
into account. Thus, fearing dismissal, workers may be unwilling to invest in firm-specific skills 
or disclose information facilitating pro-productive innovations at the workplace. The formation 
of a union and the introduction of a system of industrial jurisprudence is one way of protecting 
employees’ interests. In this way, unions may generate worker cooperation, including the 
introduction of efficiency-enhancing work practices. 
 Thus, the governance function of unions has the potential to improve employee 
motivation and the flow of information between the two sides and reduce strike activity 
attributable to mistakes stemming from informational asymmetries. Employee motivation and 
strike incidence are two further behavioral outcomes also examined in the present treatment. But 
if a union can make credible the employers’ ex ante promises (Malcomson 1983), there must be 
some threat of credible punishment by the union, which hinges on the union having bargaining 
power. Subsequent development of the collective voice model recognizes the problem of 
bargaining power. We refer to Freeman and Lazear’s (1995) purpose-built analysis of the 
employee workplace representation – specifically, the works council and its 
codetermination/joint governance power at the workplace.3 Freeman and Lazear argue that 
codetermination will be underprovided by the market because institutions that give power to 
workers will affect the distribution as well as the size of the joint surplus. Some means of third-
party regulation limiting bargaining power has thus to be found if the societal benefits of worker 
voice are to be realized. Two features of the German Betriebsrat commend that institution to 
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Freeman and Lazear in this regard. First, German works councils cannot strike under the “peace 
obligation” (or Friedenspflicht). Second, neither can they formally engage in bargaining over 
wages and other conditions of employment unless authorized to do so under the relevant 
industry-level or regional collective bargaining agreement. In this respect, the authors speak of a 
potential decoupling of the factors that determine the size of the surplus from those that 
determine its distribution made possible by labor law and the dual system of industrial relations. 
Left open is whether or not there is a sufficient decoupling in practice.4 
 In the light of the foregoing, a potentially crucial case can be made for distinguishing 
between types of workplace representation as determinants of the behavioral outcomes examined 
here.  We refer in the first instance to works council bodies on the one hand and union agencies 
on the other. However, although the works council may be viewed as the exemplar of collective 
voice, more instructive in this regard may be the distinction between types of works councils 
(and union agencies), at least when the data permit this further distinction to be made. Thus, for 
example, rising union membership of works councils may produce a different kind of works 
council, even a different kind of union workplace agency. That is to say, the information and 
consultation agency may have strong links with unions at the workplace level that may undercut 
its deliberative function.  
 The foregoing also indicates that the attitude and role of collective bargaining should be 
taken into account. In particular, is workplace representation is associated with more positive 
behavioral outcomes under particular collective bargaining regimes? Any such discussion should 
also accommodate the decentralization and hybridization of bargaining modes widely 
acknowledged to have occurred in recent years. 
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 A final issue is the quality of industrial relations or the cooperation between management 
and labor. Freeman and Medoff (1984) emphasize the importance of the quality of industrial 
relations, stating that good labor relations are more likely to produce positive performance 
whereas antagonistic forms or bad industrial relations can lead to bad performance effects. 
Indeed, they argue (p. 179) that “…unionism per se is neither a plus nor a minus to productivity. 
What matters is how unions and management interact at the workplace.” For this reason, the 
collective voice model is properly described as the collective voice/institutional response model, 
with management reaction to the expression of collective voice by unions and union feedback in 
response to any ensuing (re)organization of the work process as (no less?) critical inputs. 
Although its authors do not elaborate on the theme, following the literature we use management 
perceptions of the climate of industrial relations to fashion an indicator of the quality of 
industrial relations. This will be our fifth and final outcome indicator.  
 
III. Literature Review 
In what follows, we largely confine our review of the cross-country literature to studies that use 
the European Company Survey (ECS) and which provide a backdrop to the dependent and 
independent variables used in the present inquiry. That said, we shall also make passing 
reference to German empirical studies that have a bearing on the industrial relations climate.  
The key comparative articles are van den Berg et al. (2013), Jansen (2014), Forth, 
Bryson, and George (2017), and Braakmann and Brandl (2016). The first and the third study 
focus squarely on employee workplace representation, and on (one measure of) firm 
performance and (three) behavioral outcomes, respectively. The second study examines the 
broader issue of the organizational power of trade unions in explaining strike activity. The final 
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study is something of an outlier not only because it is the only one to use the most recent ECS 
but also because its focus is upon the relationship between firm performance and collective 
bargaining proper.  
The study by Forth, Bryson, and George (2017) is notable in distinguishing between 
union and works council forms of employee representation, noting the considerable variation 
across countries in the share of workplaces with either form of representation; with some 
countries having just one type (e.g. the works council in Germany and Austria, as compared with 
exclusive trade union workplace representation in Sweden) and yet others with both forms. Three 
behavioral outcomes are examined: management-identified problems in retaining staff (the proxy 
for quits), either a “quite strained” or a “very strained” work climate (the indicator of industrial 
relations quality), and situations in which the manager respondent reports low employee 
motivation (the motivation measure). While admitting the ambiguity of the collective voice 
model with respect to the overall climate of industrial relations – on the grounds that this may 
deteriorate in the presence of effective workplace ‘social dialogue’ – the authors emphasize the 
base prediction of that model that quit rates will be reduced by effective voice.  
The authors regress their three binary indicators on trade union/works council 
representation and a full set of workplace characteristics. In a first specification, the authors 
consider the contribution of a simple presence of any trade union or works council representation 
as opposed to no workplace representation. In a second specification, they replace this 
overarching measure with three categorical indicators, namely trade union representation only, 
works council representation only, and the presence of both union and works council 
representation.  The result of the former exercise is that the presence of either form of 
representation is associated with a greater probability of observing a strained work climate. 
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However, workplace representation as measured plays no role in influencing motivation or staff 
retention. Turning to the second specification, only the dual channel regressor is statistically 
significant; specifically, workplaces with both works council and trade union representation are 
again more likely to have a strained climate but on this occasion less likely to report problems 
with staff retention. 
In their study of workplace representation and economic performance, again using the 
2009 ECS, van den Berg et al. (2013) estimate the impact of “the information and consultation 
body” on the economic performance of the firm, as proxied by the subjective evaluation of the 
management respondent of the ‘economic situation’ of the firm on a 5-point Likert scale. The 
model also includes the presence or otherwise of a trade union in the firm. In a second 
specification, the ‘attitudes’ of the employee representation body, either positive or negative as 
assessed by management, enter as added regressors.5 
At this point, we should note that management attitudes toward the works council are 
used to identify different types of works council in the German literature. For example, a recent 
study by Pfeifer (2014) identifies three types of works councils according to management’s 
characterization of their role in managerial decision making as alternately mostly in line with 
management, different but consistent in practice with management, or opposed to consensus in 
principle – and where the two latter types also engage in bargaining. The typologies are linked to 
nine human resource management problems including high turnover, high absenteeism, and low 
work motivation. Using data from the 2006 wave of the IAB Establishment panel (n = 11,563) 
Pfeifer reports that negative effects on motivation and absenteeism are found for antagonistic 
councils and favorable effects on turnover (strictly, quits of skilled workers) for the two more 
cooperative works council types. Dilger (2006) obtains similar results to Pfeifer but identifies 
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works council types on the basis of the perceptions of both sides as to the state of mutual 
cooperation.  
Returning to the study by van den Berg et al. (2013), although no distinction is drawn 
between forms of workplace representation, the hallmark of the authors’ treatment is the prior 
grouping of nations into five clusters, according to whether worker representation conforms to 
the Germanic, French, Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, or Transitional Economy models. Their 
model thus offers an alternative to or sensitivity test of a baseline model estimated over all 
countries.  
Controversially, it is reported that the information and consultation body has a negative 
impact on performance in the Germanic 3-nation cluster (Germany, Austria, and the 
Netherlands) but is very positive in the 2-nation Anglo-Saxon cluster (the U.K. and Ireland). The 
interpretation offered is that where worker involvement is voluntary the firm may benefit from 
installing such representation. It is also reported that union presence has a negative effect in the 
French and Transitional Economy clusters “underscoring the more active and ideological role of 
trade unions in these parts of the EU” (van den Berg et al. 2013: 42).6 For the authors’ second 
specification, which introduces the attitude variables, it is reported that a positive management 
view of the worker involvement process is associated with improved economic performance in 
all but the Anglo-Saxon and Transitional Economy clusters.   
Again using data from the 2009 ECS, Jansen (2014) examines strike incidence. The main 
contribution of this study resides in its attempt to identify the extent to which variations in union 
organization are associated with strike incidence at the level of individual firms. The focus is 
upon union organization factors rather than employee workplace representation bodies – all of 
which agencies are referred to as “works councils.” In examining how company-level effects 
13 
 
 
differ across countries, Jansen deploys a mixed effects logistic regression procedure. This 
application, as well as the attention paid to union organization arguments, is also followed in the 
present inquiry.  
Abstracting here from that part of his analysis that exploits cross-level effects of national 
indicators (i.e. differences in national trade unions systems), other than to note the finding that 
density, number of union confederations, and degree of decentralization7 are found to 
independently increase strike activity, and focusing therefore upon his company-level effects 
specification, Jansen reports that the likelihood of a strike is some 1.4 times greater where a 
collective agreement is negotiated at a level higher than company level. For their part, the 
proportion of union members in the workforce, multi-unionism, and union penetration of the 
“works council” are all positively correlated with strike incidence. Most notably, companies in 
which trade union members make up more than one-half of the local works council are 1.3 times 
more likely to confront a strike than their counterparts where there is no union majority. 
The final study considered here is the sole treatment to use data from the 2013 ECS. 
Braakmann and Brandl (2016) examine the effect of the collective bargaining system on a 
subjective measure of the labor productivity of the firm. This productivity measure is largely 
collapsed into a single dummy variable taking the value of 1 if labor productivity increased, 0 
otherwise. It is regressed on a comprehensive, 12-element categorization of bargaining type that 
combines information in the ECS on the collective agreement obtaining in the firm (individual 
bargaining, company or establishment, sectoral, and national) with external information on 
integrative interaction between bargaining units (i.e. whether single-level sectoral bargaining and 
two-and three-level bargaining systems can be regarded as either horizontally 
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coordinated/uncoordinated or vertically governed/ungoverned, respectively (see also Traxler, 
Blaschke, and Kittel 2001).  
Although the study has a detailed set of control variables, including dummies for the 
presence of a works council and a union representative, only coefficient estimates for the 12 
bargaining types are reported. It is found for the base specification that, vis-à-vis the reference 
category of individual bargaining, the share of companies with productivity increases is 
significantly higher for coordinated sector and national bargaining in single-level systems; for 
governed company and sector bargaining, and governed company and national bargaining in 
two-level systems; and for governed company, sector, and national bargaining in three-level 
systems. The authors ultimately conclude that coordinated sector collective bargaining, governed 
company and sector bargaining, and governed national, sectoral and company level agreements – 
identified with Austria, Germany, and the Nordic countries, respectively – are associated with 
superior relative performance, whereas company and individual level bargaining regimes post 
only an “average” performance rating compared with all other categories. 
Given the long standing interest in the efficacy of different collective bargaining systems 
in the macro policy literature, coupled with the seeming transformation/hybridization of national 
collective bargaining systems in recent years (Addison 2016; Visser 2013, 2016), we shall 
replace the 4-element ECS typology of collective bargaining used in much of our analysis with 
the 12-element Braakmann-Brandl measure in some of our own specifications to see if it adds to 
our understanding of the determinants of our four behavioral outcomes.  
 
IV. Data and Methods 
The dataset 
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Our main data source is the 2013 European Company Survey (ECS), an establishment-based 
inquiry covering 32 European nations. We focus here on the 28 member countries of the 
European Union. The raw data was downloaded from the U.K. Data Service site at 
https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/. 
 The Survey includes detailed information on employee representation at the workplace, 
which as we have seen is a key aspect of our analysis. However, various data manipulation 
procedures on the original files were required in order to establish relevant categories for the 
empirical investigation. In particular, we need to identify mutually exclusive types of worker 
representation body as either works councils or union bodies. The problem is that although 
employees may be represented by a works council or a union agency, they may also be 
represented by both. Clearly in countries such as Germany (Sweden) where only works council 
(trade union) representation is allowed, assigning mutually exclusive worker representation 
agencies is automatic. And there is also no assignment problem in the case of establishments 
having only one type of representative body in situ even if both are possible. But what of 
establishments with two institutions present, in which – as in all cases – only one worker 
representative is interviewed? Here, all that is required is information on the type of respondent. 
Thus, if the person interviewed is a works councilor, then the works council is the leading 
institution; and if the respondent is a member of the trade union agency, then the union is the 
principal entity. This procedure is based on the fact that the respondent for the ER interview (see 
below) is, by definition, a person who is entitled to represent the opinions of the leading 
employee representation body (see the 3rd ECS Sampling Report, p. 26/81). As a result, we end 
up with mutually exclusive situations in which the works council or the union agency is the  
prevalent form of worker representation: a prevalent works council if there is either a unique 
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works council at the workplace or where the works council entity can be adjudged more 
influential than the corresponding union agency; and mutatis mutandis for a prevalent union 
agency. We shall also refer to prevalent works councils as a works council-type representation 
and to a prevalent union agency as simply union representation.    
The 2013 ECS survey has two separate components: the Employee Representative 
Questionnaire (ER) and the Management Questionnaire (MM). In the former, the interviewee is 
questioned on various issues related to labor organization, namely union density at establishment 
level and whether the employee representation body has a majority of trade union members. For 
its part, the MM questionnaire elicits information on a variety of establishment characteristics, 
including the existing type of employee representation at the workplace and the type of collective 
agreement if any. 
 By construction, all the units in the ER survey have an employee workplace 
representation body. They are necessarily a fraction of the MM sample as only MM units with a 
workplace representation entity are eligible to answer the ER questionnaire (and of these not all 
are actually interviewed). As a result, the MM sample comprises some 27,000 units while the ER 
sample contains only 7,600 firms. Furthermore, given that the two sets of information are 
provided in separate files, in order to use the MM and ER variables in a single frame we have to 
link the two files.8 Our matching procedure generated a matched MM-ER sample of some 1,400 
units. In other words, the confidentiality constraints are such that only a part of the original ER 
sample can be safely linked to the MM sample. Finally, from the full MM sample, we also 
extracted the subset of establishments with formal workplace representation to obtain a reduced 
MM sample of some 13,000 units. As is the case of the full MM sample, no ER variables are 
available in this sample. 
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The definition and sample means of the selected MM and ER variables are given in 
Appendix Table 1. The first set of variables shown are the outcome indicators, namely the 
objective strike incidence measure (a stoppage or strike in the establishment in the last 12 
months, extracted from the ER questionnaire) and the four dichotomous industrial relations 
performance indicators derived from management responses:  a good or a very good the general 
work climate in the establishment; high levels of sickness leave; difficulties in retaining 
employees; and low workforce motivation. The second set of variables relate to workplace 
representation and union organization. This group includes union density at establishment level 
as well as union membership of the employee workplace representation bodies. The latter 
information allows us to further distinguish between our two types of workplace representation 
as either union-dominated or otherwise. Establishments are also grouped by employment size, 
industry affiliation, and private/public ownership. Other establishment characteristics include 
information on whether an establishment is a single entity or a part of a wider organization, its 
workforce composition, as well as various measures of organizational change and performance-
based pay.  
 The information on the existence of collective agreements is assembled in two different 
ways. The first reclassifies the raw information (i.e. company, sector, and national agreements) 
according to the categories of company level, higher than company level, and mixed level 
bargaining.  (Observe that individual bargaining between worker and firm remains the omitted 
category.) This re-classification is pursued so as to facilitate comparison with the existing 
literature based on the 2009 ECS (e.g. Jansen 2014). The second application follows Braakmann 
and Brandl (2016) to derive a country- and establishment-based classification with twelve 
collective bargaining system dummies, individual bargaining again serving as the reference 
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category (see section III). Finally, we deploy two country-level synthetic indicators of union 
decentralization and bargaining centralization. This classification has a basis in the Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (or 
ICTWSS) database (see Visser 2013). Bargaining centralization captures bargaining level, 
articulation, and use of opening clauses. For its part, union decentralization captures union power 
in local wage bargaining, appointment of workplace representatives, finances of local branches, 
strike funds and strike vetoes. In both cases, the indicator is given by increasing order, on a 0-5 
and 0-7 scale, for the bargaining centralization and union decentralization, respectively. 
 For the (full) MM sample, and focusing on workplace organization and collective 
bargaining types, workplace representation is present in approximately 50 percent of the cases, 
with the prevalent union and prevalent works council entities having about the same share 
(unweighted statistics). In turn, in one-third of the cases establishments are not covered by any 
type of collective agreement, while single-level company, sector, and national bargaining are 
present in one-quarter of the cases. The remaining instances comprise either two- or three-level 
bargaining situations. 
 For the MM-ER matched sample, union density averages 44 percent. For all these 
establishments with a formal workplace representation, there is a union-dominated works council 
(i.e. a works council with a majority of councilors who are trade union members) in 26 percent 
of the cases, while the share of union-dominated union bodies is 19 percent. In the remaining 55 
percent of the cases, there is therefore no union domination in the sense that the majority of the 
representatives do not have a trade union affiliation. The matched MM-ER sample is also 
relatively more populated with works councils, which constitute approximately 60 percent of the 
total. (We do not comment separately on the make-up of the MM subset here.)  
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Modeling 
We test the potential role of the selected institutions on industrial relations performance by 
specifying a two-level mixed-effects logit model that controls for a wide set of observables, 
including performance-based pay, organizational change, workforce composition, industry 
affiliation, establishment size, private ownership, single establishment, and training participation. 
In a compact manner, the corresponding logistic regression model can be specified as:  
                                                       Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1| 𝑋𝑖𝑗, 𝑢𝑗 ) = 𝐻(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑢𝑗),                  (1) 
where 𝐻(. ) is the logistic cumulative distribution function and establishment 𝑖 is nested in group 
(country) j, with 𝑖, = 1, 2, … , 𝐼, and 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽. 𝑋𝑖𝑗 includes all the observed establishment 
characteristics, while  𝑢𝑗 is the random intercept. 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the selected 1/0 outcome indicator. In 
order to simplify the interpretation of the results, we will only report the marginal effects, 
obtained by fixing the random effects at their theoretical mean (i.e. zero) and all control variables 
at their sample mean. 
The information at the first-level (i.e. the establishment) is therefore nested within 
countries or clusters (the second level). A model that ignores this hierarchy and looks at the data 
as simply an enlarged sample would treat the observables as independent information, which has 
implications for the conventional statistical tests. In particular, standard multiple regression 
analysis with one dependent variable at the establishment level and a set of regressors from all 
available levels will fail to recognize that (a) observations within clusters are correlated because 
individual responses from establishments are influenced by the social groups or countries to 
which they belong, and (b) the properties of countries are influenced by the set of establishments 
that make up the group. In this context, respondents from the same country are thus much more 
alike than respondents from different countries as a result of some unobserved cluster effect. If 
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this aspect is not taken into account in the modeling strategy, the estimated standard errors are 
likely to be too small, thus generating spuriously significant results.9 
Conjectures 
To repeat, the principal goal of the modeling exercise is to shed light on the operation of 
workplace representation. At the most general level, is it to be viewed as a classic vehicle of 
collective voice or might not the overall tenor of industrial relations “suffer in the presence of 
effective social dialogue”? (Forth, Bryson, and George 2017: 428). As we have seen, the theory 
is equivocal, only unambiguously predicting a negative relationship between the expression of 
collective voice and quits. In distinguishing between types of workplace representation, our 
maintained hypothesis is that works council type bodies are less likely to engage in distributive 
bargaining and exert a more positive influence upon the behavioral outcomes identified here. 
Equally, we have argued that works councils are not a datum and may be expected to be 
influenced (differentially) by union organization and collective bargaining. The attitude of the 
works council may in turn be reflected in employer appreciation or disquiet with the functioning 
of worker representation as expressed in the separate quality of industrial relations variable. 
When it comes to the association between workplace representation and collective bargaining, 
although there are indications that works council effects may be positive when its deliberations 
are anchored in a system where wages are largely determined at sectoral level, the picture is 
clouded by changes in collective bargaining detected in the macro literature. That is to say, 
relationships once present in the data (say the 2009 ECS) may no longer be apparent in the 2013 
data. Moreover, the changes in question may have blurred anticipated differences in outcomes 
between the two types of workplace representation, bringing the two agencies closer together – 
and possibly for the better. With these conjectures and caveats in mind, and the further caution 
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that correlation does not establish causation, we now turn to an examination of the empirical 
evidence.  
 
V. Results and Discussion  
Our first set of results is contained in Table 1, which uses data from the (full) Management 
questionnaire. It will be recalled that the selected outcomes are all subjective measures and cover 
the industrial relations climate, absenteeism, worker retention, and worker motivation.  
[Table 1 near here] 
Summary regression results are provided in the four main columns of the table. The 
evidence provided in main column A of the table indicates that the employee workplace 
representation body (be it a union agency or a works council-type entity) is associated with a 
pessimistic management view of the prevailing state of the climate of industrial relations in the 
establishment vis-à-vis the situation where formal employee workplace representation is absent. 
On average, compared with the control group, council-type representation implies a reduction of 
around 2 percentage points in the predicted probability of there being a good/very good industrial 
relations climate. For its part, a trade union agency implies a larger, 5 percentage point reduction. 
In contrast, applicable collective agreements, especially those containing terms and conditions 
set at higher than company level, are seen as favorable to the climate of industrial relations.  
Note that the potential role of these institutions – workplace representation and collective 
bargaining – is found to be largely insensitive to the inclusion of synthetic, country-wide 
indicators, flagged here by the union decentralization indicator and the bargaining centralization 
index. The former is statistically significant at the .05 level in column A(2) and negative in sign 
while the latter, in column A(3), lacks statistical significance at conventional levels.  
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 In column A(4) the four types of collective agreements included in column A(1) are 
replaced by the detailed, 12 collective bargaining categories from Braakmann and Brandl (2016), 
with individual bargaining again forming the omitted category. There is the suggestion that the 
three-level system of company, sector, and national bargaining is associated with a more positive 
view of the quality of industrial relations, while coordinated sector bargaining seems marginally 
favorable as well. But there is no strong indication that coordination in single level systems or 
governed bargaining in multi-level systems plays a decisive role in influencing positive 
management perceptions of industrial relations performance. Management seems generally 
happier if the wage setting process is not restricted to individual bargaining, or to the company 
level, seeing wider agreements as broadly favorable to a good working environment, largely 
irrespective of the degree of governability or coordination. Taking wages out of competition 
might also of course be reflected in this result.  
 The results for sickness/absenteeism are given in main column B. Observe that both 
works councils and union representation bodies are strongly positively associated with higher 
absenteeism, the corresponding marginal effects having approximately the same magnitude as 
those obtained in main column A. Also note that collective bargaining now yields few benefits in 
this respect in contrast to the results for the climate of industrial relations. On net, we would 
interpret both results as aspects of worker power, with worker representation offering protection 
from management sanction in respect of sickness and absenteeism. 
 In principle, if voice substitutes for exit, then workers should be less likely to quit as their 
concerns are addressed by management. Yet we find no suggestion in main column C of 
workplace representation of either type of workplace representation being associated with 
reduced difficulties in retaining staff, echoing the rather pessimistic results first reported in main 
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column A. However, we note parenthetically that we do find that training reduces the difficulties 
in retaining staff: the regression coefficient for this argument being both negative and highly 
statistically significant. (This finding and results for other regressors not identified in the table 
are available from the authors upon request.)  
 Interestingly, collective agreements appear generally favorable to worker retention and, 
as shown in A(2) and A(3), increasing (decreasing) levels of bargaining centralization (union 
decentralization) also seem broadly beneficial to worker retention. Moreover, the coefficients of 
all the more detailed collective agreement categories identified in column A(4) are always 
negative, and in four cases statistically significant at conventional levels, again vis-à-vis the 
reference category of individual bargaining between worker and firm.  
Finally, in main column D, we present the results for the fourth outcome indicator. We 
find no confirmation that worker representation is associated with higher perceived levels of 
worker motivation. Indeed, there is some evidence to the contrary: for employee workplace 
representation secured through a union agency there is a strong direct association with low 
motivation, with a marginal effect in the 5 percentage point range. As was the case for staff 
retention, a higher degree of union decentralization elevates problems (although on this occasion 
greater bargaining centralization does not ameliorate them). Finally, observe that the more 
detailed disaggregation of collective bargaining systems offers little value added. 
In Table 2, in addition to the set of covariates included in Table 1, we control directly for 
union ‘influence’ on workplace representation (via our union ‘domination’ construct) and also 
for establishment-level union density. As this key information on labor organizational power is 
only available in the ER questionnaire, the corresponding regressions are carried by matching the 
two subsets of the ECS database (viz. the ER and MM samples),10 which as mentioned earlier 
24 
 
 
yields a reduced (matched) sample of only some 1,400 establishments. More positive is our 
ability to deploy an additional indicator of industrial relations performance – the strikes 
incidence variable – which is only available in the ER questionnaire. By construction, the no 
workplace representation comparator is absent from these matched sample regressions. 
[Table 2 near here] 
We begin our discussion of Table 2 by first reporting findings for the four subjectively 
defined behavioral indicators considered earlier before turning to the association between 
employee workplace representation and our objective indicator of the quality of industrial 
relations, namely strike incidence. In the first place, as shown in main column A of the table, 
union density at the workplace does not seem to improve management’s assessment of the 
perceived quality of industrial relations. Higher union density is likely to flag a more politicized 
voice. In this case, management perceptions will be that contestation is higher and industrial 
relations quality duly lower. No parallel effect can be detected in main columns B through D, 
where the union density term is at best only weakly statistically significant. This argues against 
the likelihood of a ‘negative judgment bias by management,’ whereby an adverse evaluation of 
the industrial relations climate by management permeates the other (subjective) behavioral 
outcome indicators. The role of collective agreements in columns A through D is also less 
pronounced than in Table 1. A similar result is found for the bargaining system arguments; in 
general, the associated coefficient estimates and respective marginal effects are largely 
statistically insignificant, and certainly never statistically significant at the 0.01 level. One 
explanation might be that once worker representation is present at the workplace – which, by 
construction, is true for all establishments in this sample – the wider collective bargaining 
environment becomes less of a factor.  
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 The key finding, however, is the negative marginal effect of the union-dominated union 
agency in main column A, which is significant at the 0.05 level and relatively large in 
magnitude. Thus, if dominated by union members, union workplace representation bodies are not 
associated with a good workplace climate. For its part, absenteeism seems to have no strong 
connection with unionism at the workplace, as none of the variables contained in the workplace 
representation/labor organization subset is statistically significant. In the case of worker 
retention, union dominance is associated with greater problems for union agency, albeit only at 
the 0.10   level of significance. In turn, motivation tends to be lower in the case of both the union 
agency and the works council if they are union dominated. Once again, however, these results 
are only weakly statistically significant.  
 The results for strike incidence given in the final main column of Table 2 are statistically 
stronger. Under the hypothesis that strikes are mainly bargaining failures, given the 
informational content of the collective voice model the expectation would be that strikes will be 
less in evidence whenever there is an employee workplace representative body in place. 
However, it will be recalled that there is no absence-of-workplace-representation comparator in 
the matched sample and that we can only distinguish between union- and nonunion-dominated 
works councils, union- and nonunion-dominated union agencies, and nonunion-works councils 
and nonunion-dominated union agencies. Against this backdrop, the indications are that: (a) 
works councils are generally associated with a lower strike incidence when compared with the 
union counterpart (if neither is union dominated); and (b) that strike incidence is increasing if the 
majority of the works councilors are members of a trade union, with a marginal effect in the 8 to 
9 percentage point range that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The suggestion is that in 
the former case the expression of voice is more collaborative under works council-type 
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representation than union agencies, while in the latter case voice is more politicized. Note also 
that in supportive vein higher union density at the workplace is associated with higher strike 
incidence.  Finally, given that we control in all regressions for a variety of sources of 
discontinuity or disruption at plant level (e.g. changes in pay systems and in working hours), the 
reported effects are net of any impact arising from measured/observed organizational changes. 
Another means of distinguishing between types of worker representation (but not 
between workplace representation and its absence) is to use a subset of the MM sample, selecting 
only those establishments with formal workplace representation. In this way, we compare works 
council-type bodies with their union counterparts, sacrificing information on whether or not the 
representation body has a majority of union members and no longer controlling for union density 
at establishment level. Other things equal, if works councils enhance collaboration rather than 
amplify disagreement, their presence should be associated with more favorable outcomes. The 
results of this implementation are provided in Table 3. 
[Table 3 near here] 
 Main column A of Table 3 confirms at the 0.01 level that the industrial relations climate 
at the workplace is viewed as superior in works council establishments. From main column B 
there is also the suggestion that absenteeism is also perceived to be lower in works council 
establishments (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). Worker motivation in main column D 
is also strongly associated with works council representation. Only in the case of worker 
retention is statistical significance lacking. In all the other cases, the estimated marginal effects 
are in the 3 to 5 percentage point range.  The comparator it will be recalled is the union 
counterpart of the works council. Although not dramatic, the regressions for the reduced MM 
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sample are supportive of a differentiated role of worker representation, namely one that favors 
the works council variant at least from the perspective of management. 
We also performed two further sensitivity tests, in both of which Table 1 serves as the 
comparator. In the first set of tests, we differentiate between several types of formal 
representation, namely, works council representation only, union representation only, and the 
presence of both union and works council representation. We subsequently retain the first two 
categories but differentiate the third, now identifying two distinct situations: one in which the 
works council is the more important of the two and the other in which the union agency is the 
more important (see section IV).11 The second sensitivity test addresses the role of country 
clusters by presenting separate estimation results for such groups: the Germanic, French, Anglo-
Saxon, Nordic, and Transition clusters, respectively. 
The results of the first set of sensitivity tests are given in Table 4. In case A we recall 
from Table 1 that both works council and union representation were negatively associated with 
the perceived quality of industrial relations, with the latter entity recording a higher (in absolute 
value) marginal effect. This result is confirmed in panel (a) of the table, with the ‘works council 
only’ marginal effect displaying the lowest magnitude and either a ‘union only’ or a union and 
works council (irrespective of which body is prevalent) presence having larger marginal effects. 
Panel (b) of the Table introduces a further clarification: if both types of representation are 
present, the magnitude of the marginal effect is smaller when the works council representation is 
the more important of the two entities. This results holds in all three columns, A(1) through A(3). 
(For reasons of economy we do not replicate column A(4) of Table 1.) 
[Table 4 near here] 
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These results carry over to sickness/absenteeism in main column B. Situations in which 
either the works council is the sole agency or the more important of the two entities – see panels 
(a) and (b) respectively – again show smaller marginal effects.  As in main column C of Table 1, 
the relevant marginal effects are not statistically significant in main column C of Table 4, and so 
the staff retention results are not further discussed here. On the other hand, the results for worker 
motivation, shown in main column D, confirm the result that works councils either alone or 
where the more important agency of the two are less associated with lower employee motivation 
than is the case for union representation alone or a predominant union agency where both entities 
are present. 
Overall, the results in Table 4 would suggest that the effects of unions and works councils 
at the workplace are not additive. That is to say, the simultaneous effect reported in the table 
seem after all to be limited to union and predominantly-union effects. These results are 
furthermore consistent with our maintained hypothesis of the relative efficacy of works council 
versus union agency voice.  
The search for commonalities across countries has been the main goal in this paper. Now 
we look to possible national singularities. Table 5 offers a replication of Table 1, based on the 
assumption that countries in the sample can be clustered in five distinct groups after van den 
Berg et al. (2013).  We note at the outset that the sample comprises 25 countries rather than the 
28 nations in Table 1 – as Croatia, Cyprus and Malta are not included in van den Berg et al. – 
and also that we include Luxembourg in the Germanic cluster (rather than in the French cluster), 
given that all the respondents from Luxembourg in the 2013 ER survey have works council 
representation. 
[Table 5 near here] 
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Country clusters do of course reduce the size of the relevant estimation samples, and 
sometimes very substantially, but in no case are the signs of the statistically significant marginal 
effects in Table 5 reversed in comparison with the corresponding coefficients in Table 1 – that 
are again reproduced in the first column of the table. In main column A, in particular, it can be 
seen that the works council representation in the Germanic and French clusters is associated with 
reduced IR quality, while union representation is also negatively signed in countries within the 
French tradition, as well as in the case of Eastern European transition countries. The magnitude 
of the estimated marginal effects also accords with what we obtained in Table 1. 
The same patterns can be observed in main columns B, C, and D. For example, in column 
B, the marginal effects are again statistically significant in the Germanic and French clusters, 
while in column C we replicate quite strongly the results obtained in Table 1 for all clusters. In 
case D we observe the strongest marginal effects for union-type representation. Contrary to 
Table 1, however, we now report that works council representation in Transition economies is 
negatively associated with lower levels of motivation, albeit only at the 0.10 level. 
 Of the results in Table 5, those for the United Kingdom and Ireland are frankly less 
impressive. Indeed, although the (bivariate) correlation coefficients (available to readers upon 
request) suggest, especially for the U.K., that union representation tends to be positively 
associated with high levels of sickness/absenteeism, difficulties in retaining staff, and low 
motivation, these relationships did not survive multivariate mixed effects estimation for that 
cluster. Although these countries may be deviants or at least indicative of substantial effect of 
heterogeneity, the issue of sample size is not without relevance here. The Anglo-Saxon cluster is 
by far the smallest of all five country groupings. Taken in conjunction with the fact that the 
marginal effects in Table 1 are modest to begin with, the lack of statistical significance may not 
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be altogether surprising. This still leaves the case of the Nordic cluster where no significant 
findings are reported in Table 5.  Here we would enter the speculation that labor-management 
relations are more consensual than in other clusters, while the degree of employee representation 
is also greater. This concatenation of characteristics makes it more difficult to capture differences 
across establishments with and without worker representation. Recall that the omitted category in 
the case of worker representation is an absence of representation. More consensual labor-
management relations and high degrees of employee representation may then play a part in 
explaining the lack of statistical significance of the parameters of interest for this group. 
 Overall, in comparing employee workplace representation with its absence, we do not 
then obtain a clear rejection of the notion that collective voice is mostly disputatious. Also, in 
those cases where there is information on majority trade union membership of worker 
representation agencies, the evidence also points in the direction of contestation. However, when 
comparing works councils and union bodies, there is a clear indication that the former vehicle is 
from the standpoint of management associated with the better overall industrial relations 
performance. 
 
VI. Conclusions   
We shall largely confine our concluding remarks to workplace representation. Beginning 
with strike incidence, there was some suggestion that the effects of workplace employee 
representation might be both beneficial and influenced by unionism. That is to say, nonunion-
dominated works councils were associated with lower strike incidence than their counterpart 
(nonunion-dominated) union entities, while union-dominated works councils were associated 
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with greater strike activity than other works councils. Union density at the workplace was also 
associated with greater strike incidence.   
If these results were in accordance with our priors, we found no strong suggestion that 
works councils or union bodies were associated with a better industrial relations climate – or that 
either entity was positively associated with IR quality when compared with an absence of 
representation. These results appear somewhat at odds with the strikes data. The qualification is 
the rather strong positive association between coverage by a collective agreement (versus no 
coverage) and industrial relations quality in both the full sample and (in part) for the matched 
sample.   
Moreover, one of the strongest predictions of the collective voice model – that worker 
representation should improve labor retention– was not borne out for either of the above 
samples. Nevertheless, employee motivation was adjudged least favorable by management in 
circumstances where union agencies predominated in the case of the full sample and for work 
council and union entities in which a majority of the membership was unionized in the matched 
sample. However, any such disfavor emphatically does not carry over to collective bargaining 
proper. 
Our strongest (and most consistent) results were for the reduced MM sample where 
works council and union representation situations are explicitly compared, although we can no 
longer control for union membership of the worker representation body or for plant-level union 
density. Specifically, situations in which works council-type bodies are either the sole 
representative body or the more influential agency (as compared with instances in which union 
workplace representation prevails) are correlated with favorable outcomes for three out of the 
four behavioral indicators. 
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Separate sensitivity analyses either confirmed the latter results or suggested more 
generally that our findings did not display any particular dependence on any specific country 
subset. But if our results offer qualified support for the collective voice model, there remains the 
vexed question of the influence of collective bargaining decentralization and hybridization. 
Although low levels of union decentralization are in general found to be associated with good 
industrial relations, improved labor retention and better worker motivation, the evidence for the 
bargaining centralization index is mixed. For its part, the refinement produced by combining the 
type of collective agreement applicable to the establishment with country-wide indicators of 
coordinated and governed bargaining did not on this occasion prove to be enlightening. 
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Endnotes 
1. The legislation complements the information and consultation provisions of extant law on 
collective dismissals (Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998), transfers of undertakings (Directive 
2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001) and, in the transnational context, on European Works Councils 
(Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994).  
 
2.  Moreover, recent research has suggested that when one controls for the endogenous selection 
induced by the sorting of workers into unionized jobs, the material difference in job satisfaction 
between unionized and non-unionized workers no longer obtains or is much reduced (see 
Laroche 2016 and the references contained therein). In short, a selection effect rather than a 
causal effect may characterize the relationship between union membership and dissatisfaction. 
Rather than dissatisfaction, distributional conflict (and mutual perceptions of the relationship 
between the two sides) may be more the more relevant consideration(s).  
 
3.  The content of collective voice is also spelled out in more detail in this treatment in terms of a 
continuum bounded by information provision at one extreme and participation/codetermination 
at the other, with consultation occupying the broad middle ground.  
4.  For an application of the Freeman-Lazear hypothesis, see Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) who 
conclude that, notwithstanding the two faces of works councils, the discipline of an industry 
collective agreement makes this decoupling more likely.  
5. The two variables are based, respectively, on the following assessments of the manager 
respondent: (a) “The employee representation helps us in a constructive manner to find ways to 
improve the workplace performance”; and (b) “The involvement of employee representation 
often leads to considerable delays in important management decisions.” 
 
6. That said, the authors report an absence of any effect emanating from unions in the 
Scandinavian cluster, despite what is described as their strong position and fundamentally 
positive attitudes. 
 
7.  Union decentralization is defined as the inverse of the authority unions have over local 
branches, and we shall also have recourse to a similar such argument in the present paper. The 
decentralization phenomenon has been most for Germany with mixed results; see, inter al., 
Dustman et al., 2014; Ellguth, Gerner, and Stegmaier, 2014; Addison et al. 2017). 
 
8. Specifically, in 2013, for our sample of countries in the MM dataset, we selected all 
establishments having valid information on the dummy variables ERTYPE_A, ERTYPE_B, …, 
ERTYPE_G. These variables flag the presence of a formal or informal ER body and the specific 
type of worker representation actually present at the organization. In a second stage, we used all 
the establishments in the ER survey and generated an establishment identifier. A third stage 
linked the MM and ER datasets by using the common raw variables w4_MM_emp_freq (i.e. the 
establishment weight), est_size3 (i.e. establishment size), and NACE6_R1_1 (i.e. sector).  In the 
fourth and final stage we dropped all establishments in the ER dataset for which there was no 
unique matching.  Unsurprisingly, the common set is rather restricted, otherwise matching would 
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be a trivial exercise. The limitation of the matching procedure is that it was not possible to map 
all the ER units across to the MM dataset. 
9. We tested alternative multiple non-linear regression models. In particular, we ran an ordinary 
logit model with country dummies and cluster-robust standard errors. In this model there was no 
change in the sign of the regressors, while the t-ratios tended to be slightly higher. Since in 
virtually all the regressions reported in section V the log-likelihood ratio tests comfortably 
rejected the null that the random variation of the country intercepts is zero, our preference was to 
focus on the two-level mixed effects case. 
10. The alternative would be to jettison all variables contained in the MM questionnaire and limit 
oneself to the more restricted arguments of the ER survey. 
11. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach. 
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Table 1. Workplace Representation, Collective Bargaining Type, National Bargaining Systems, and Subjectively Defined Industrial Relations 
Performance, Management Survey Sample, 2013 ECS (Marginal Effects) 
Outcome indicator 
A: Good or very good industrial relations climate 
(Mean: 0.83) 
B: High level of sickness/absenteeism 
(Mean: 0.16) 
Variables Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Worker representation (Reference=none):           
Works council-type representation 0.24 -.020***   -.020*** -.023***  -.018*** 0.24 .027*** .027*** .029*** .028*** 
Union-type representation  0.23 -.050*** -.049*** -.050 *** -.047*** 0.23 .051*** .051*** .056*** .052*** 
Collective agreement type  
(Reference=no collective agreement): 
 
  
       
Company level   0.14 .017** .016* .015*     0.14 -.014* -.014* -.014  
Higher than company level   0.34 .025*** .023*** .026***  0.34 -.005 -.006 -.009  
Mixed  0.18 .025*** .024*** .026***  0.18 .003 .002 .001  
Country-level synthetic indicators:           
Union decentralization    -.012**     -.0095   
Bargaining centralization     .002     .014  
Bargaining system (Reference=individual 
bargaining): 
 
   
   
  
 
BB_1_company bargaining (single-level)      .011     -.010 
BB_2_coordinated sector bargaining (single-
level)  
 
   .019* 
  
  -.001 
BB_3 uncoordinated sector bargaining (single-
level)  
 
   .014 
  
  .007 
BB_4_national bargaining (single-level)      .010     -.008 
BB_5 governed company and sector bargaining 
(two-level)  
 
   .026 
  
  .019 
BB_6_ungoverned company and sector 
bargaining (two-level)  
 
   .009 
  
  .0001 
BB_7_governed company and national 
bargaining (two-level)  
 
   .037 
  
  -.022 
BB_8_ungoverned company and national 
bargaining (two-level)  
 
   -.025 
   
 .038** 
BB_9_governed sector and national bargaining 
(two-level)  
 
   .031 
   
 -.016 
BB_10_governed sector and national bargaining 
(two-level)  
 
   -.006 
   
 -.019 
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BB_11_governed company, sector and national 
bargaining (three-level)  
 
   .074*** 
   
 -.039** 
BB_12_ungoverned company, sector and national 
bargaining (three-level)  
 
   .034** 
   
 -.018 
Number of observations  20,231 20,231 19,025 20,394  20,205 20,205 19,001 20,369 
𝜎𝑢
2  
(s.e.)  
 .225 
(.065) 
.191 
(.056) 
.183 
(.055) 
.204 
(.059) 
 .310 
(.088) 
.289 
(.082) 
.292 
(.088) 
.310 
(.088) 
LR test  463.59 356.14 379.45 332.75  490.30 455.25 412.39 476.62 
 
 
Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Outcome indicator 
C: Difficulties in retaining staff 
(Mean: 0.11) 
D: Low motivation of employees  
(Mean: 0.20) 
Variables Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Worker representation (Reference=none):           
Works council-type representation  0.24 .001 .002 .002 .001 0.24 .003 .004 .005 .003 
Union-type representation  0.23 .005 .004 .001 .004 0.23 .051*** .049*** .044*** .050*** 
Collective agreement type  
(Reference=no collective agreement): 
 
  
    
   
Company level 0.14 -.015** -.014** -.016**  0.14 -.010 -.009 -.013  
Higher than company level 0.34 -.009 -.008 -.004  0.34 -.002 .0001 -.003  
Mixed 0.18 -.019*** -.018** -.013*  0.18 -.008 -.006 -.009  
Country-level synthetic indicators:           
Union decentralization    .016***     .023***   
Bargaining centralization     -.017**     -.015  
Bargaining system (Reference=individual 
bargaining): 
 
    
   
 
 
BB_1_company bargaining      -.016**     -.011 
BB_2coordinated sector bargaining      -.016     -.017 
BB_3_uncoordinated sector bargaining     -.011     -.019 
BB_4_national bargaining     -.006     .005 
BB_5_governed company and sector bargaining     -.011     -.025 
BB_6_ungoverned company and sector 
bargaining 
 
   -.010 
  
  -.010 
40 
 
 
BB_7_governed company and national 
bargaining 
 
   -.075*** 
  
  -.032 
BB_8_ungoverned company and national 
bargaining 
 
   -.015 
  
  .013 
BB_9_governed sector and national bargaining     -.035**     -.019 
BB_10_governed sector and national bargaining     -.004     .016 
BB_11_governed company, sector and national 
bargaining 
 
   -.026 
  
  -.048* 
BB_12_ungoverned company, sector and 
national bargaining  
 
   -.032*** 
   
 -.007 
Number of observations  20,175 20,175 18,975 20,338  19,979 19,979 18,802 20,137 
𝜎𝑢
2  
(s.e.)  
 .313 
(.090) 
.206  
(.060) 
.280 
(.085) 
.305 
(.088) 
 .219 
(.062) 
.133 
(.039) 
.221 
(.066) 
.200 
(.058) 
LR test  382.54 291.21 332.03 368.82  507.09 313.49 480.46 349.38 
Notes: The two-level mixed-effects logit model includes the following additional variables: performance-based pay, organizational change, 
workforce composition, industry affiliation, establishment size, private ownership, single establishment, and training participation. The full set of 
selected variables is given in Appendix Table 1. The actual implementation in Stata uses the melogit command. The log-likelihood ratio tests the 
null of an ordinary logit specification versus the two-level mixed effects model. The null is always comfortably rejected in favor of the mixed 
effects specification. In the interests of economy, the cluster-robust standard error of the reported marginal effect is omitted from the table. The 
reported mean corresponds to column (1). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 2. Workplace Representation, Collective Agreement Type, National Bargaining Systems, and Subjectively Defined Industrial Relations 
Performance, Employee Representative-Management Survey Matched Sample, 2013 ECS (Marginal Effects) 
Outcome indicator 
A: Good or very good industrial relations climate  
(Mean: 0.79) 
B: High level of sickness/absenteeism 
(Mean: 0.25) 
Variables Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Worker representation/Labor organization:           
Union density at the workplace 0.44 -.001** -.001** -.001** -.001** 0.44 .0001 -.0002 -.0001 .0001 
Works council-type representation 0.62 -.080* -.078* -.086* -.077* 0.63 -.051 -.037 -.030 -.062 
Union-dominated works council 0.26 -.049 -.051 -.068 -.046 0.26 -.025 -.032 -.018 -.029 
Union-dominated union body 0.20 -.163** -.161** -.180** -.166** 0.20 .013 .008 -.066 .012 
Collective agreement type  
(Reference=no collective agreement): 
 
 
 
  
 
    
Company level 0.19 .016 .015 .016  0.19 .047 .047 .067  
Higher than company level 0.39 .051 .045 .071  0.39 .030 .021 .023  
Mixed 0.26 .061 .056 .080*  0.26 .074* .072* .076*  
Country-level synthetic indicators:           
Union decentralization    -.012     -.036**   
Bargaining centralization    .006     .032  
Bargaining system (Reference=individual 
bargaining): 
 
    
 
  
  
BB_1_company bargaining      .018     -.009 
BB_2_coordinated sector bargaining      .072*     -.046 
BB_3_uncoordinated sector bargaining     .104*     .023 
BB_4_national bargaining     .028     -.001 
BB_5_governed company and sector bargaining      .091*     -.015 
BB_6_ungoverned company and sector 
bargaining 
 
   .043 
 
   .047 
BB_7_governed company and national 
bargaining 
 
   .001 
 
   -.065 
BB_8_ungoverned company and national 
bargaining  
 
   .061 
 
   .152* 
BB_9_governed sector and national bargaining     .051     -.037 
BB_10_governed sector and national bargaining     -.064     -.161*** 
BB_11_governed company, sector and national 
bargaining (three-level) 
 
   .137** 
   
 .052 
BB_12_ungoverned company, sector and 
national bargaining 
 
   -.022 
   
 .071 
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Number of observations  1,365 1,365 1,271 1,371  1,363 1,363 1,269 1,368 
𝜎𝑢
2  
(s.e.)  
 .308 
(.147) 
.270 
(.136) 
.242 
(.125) 
.290 
(.146) 
 .463 
(.211) 
.317 
(.157) 
.300 
(.173) 
.512 
(.231) 
LR test  31.99 24.50 21.47 25.49  33.92 26.03 16.28 35.49 
 
Table 2 (cont.)   
 
C: Difficulties in retaining staff 
(Mean: 0.10) 
D: Low motivation of employees 
(Mean: 0.24) 
E: Strike incidence 
(Mean: 0.11) 
Variables Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Worker representation/Labor 
organization: 
 
    
 
    
  
 
  
Union density at the workplace 0.44 -.0007* -.0006 -.0006 -.0007* 0.44 .0002 .0002 .00002 .0001 0.44 .0008** .0008** .0009** .0008** 
Works council-type representation 0.63 -.025 -.023 -.021 -.029 0.63 -.038 -.036 -.033 -.036 0.63 -.047 -.045 -.050 -.052 
Union-dominated works council 0.26 -.033 -.029 -.021 -.037 0.26 .088* .090* .083* .085* 0.26 .078*** .077*** .092*** .081*** 
Union-dominated union body 0.20 .084* .088* .082* .079* 0.20 .136* .136* .111 .139* 0.20 -.0006 -.0002 -.005 .001 
Collective agreement type  
(Reference=no collective 
agreement): 
 
    
 
 
 
  
 
    
Company level 0.19 -.011 -.012 -.002  0.18 .018 .018 .004  0.19 -.054* -.051 -.074*  
Higher than company level 0.39 .008 .013 .019  0.40 -.026 -.021 -.031  0.39 -.005 -.002 -.017  
Mixed 0.26 -.008 -.006 .005  0.26 -.047 -.044 -.053  0.26 -.003 -.0008 -.011  
Country-level indicators:   
 
  
 
    
 
    
Union decentralization   .012*  
  
 .008   
 
 .004  
 
Bargaining centralization    -.021** 
  
  -.014 
  
  .056** 
 
Bargaining system  
(Reference=individual bargaining): 
 
   
  
 
     
  
 
BB_1_company bargaining     -.013 
 
 
 
 .017 
  
  -.030 
BB_2_coordinated sector 
bargaining  
 
   -.011 
 
 
 
 -.033 
  
 
 
.014 
BB_3_uncoordinated sector 
bargaining  
 
   .033 
 
 
 
 .046 
  
 
 
.043 
BB_4_national bargaining     .044 
 
 
 
 -.010 
  
 
 
.036 
BB_5_governed company and 
sector bargaining 
 
   -.040 
 
 
 
 -.071 
  
 
 
-.031 
BB_6_ungoverned company and 
sector bargaining 
 
   .028 
   
 -.068 
    
.077 
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BB_7_governed company and 
national bargaining  
 
   -.015 
   
 .041 
    
.106 
BB_8_ungoverned company and 
national bargaining 
 
   .004 
   
 -.0006 
    
.006 
BB_9_governed sector and national 
bargaining 
 
   -.027 
   
 -.068 
    
-.023 
BB_10_governed sector and 
national bargaining  
 
   .047 
   
 -.053 
    
-.035 
BB_11_governed company, sector 
and national bargaining  
 
   -.050 
   
 -.130** 
    
-.014 
BB_12_ungoverned company, 
sector and national bargaining 
 
   .019 
   
 .052 
    
.033 
Number of observations 
 
1,360 
 
1,360 1,266 
 
1,366 
  
1,341 
 
1,341 
 
1,249 
 
1,346 
  
1,366 
 
1,366 
 
1,272 
 
1,372 
𝜎𝑢
2  
(s.e.)  
 
.273 
(.162) 
 
.187   
(.130) 
.176 
(.135) 
.179 
(.130) 
  
.225 
(.114) 
 
.204 
(.110) 
 
.204 
(.113) 
 
.188 
(.108) 
  
1.673 
(.771) 
 
1.582 
(.760) 
 
1.355 
(.669) 
 
1.525   
(.727) 
LR test 
 
13.48 
 
6.91 
 
4.98 6.38 
  
26.7 
 
19.7 
 
18.83 
 
14.93 
  
85.19 
 
65.08 
 
74.86 
 
61.18 
Notes: See notes to Table 1. The two-level mixed-effects logit model includes three workplace representation dummy variables indicating the presence of a 
works council, a union-dominated union agency, and a union-dominated works council, respectively. Accordingly, given that in this sample a formal worker 
representation body is necessarily present at the establishment, the coefficient on the first variable (works council) gives the nonunion-dominated works council 
effect vis-à-vis the nonunion-dominated union body; the second (i.e. the union-dominated union coefficient) gives the union-dominated union effect vis-à-vis the 
non-union dominated union body; and the third gives the union-dominated works councils effect vis-à-vis the works council without union domination. The set 
of control variables pertaining to performance-based pay, organizational change and workforce composition are reduced to include only the statistically 
significant arguments. This procedure is designed to avoid a further reduction in the estimation sample. The reported mean corresponds to column (1). ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Workplace Representation, Collective Agreement Type, National Bargaining Systems, and Subjectively Defined Industrial Relations 
Performance, Reduced Management Survey Sample, 2013 ECS (Marginal Effects) 
 
Outcome indicator 
A: Good or very good industrial relations climate  
(Mean: 0.81) 
B: High level of sickness/absenteeism 
(Mean: 0.21) 
Variables Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Worker representation 
(Reference= union-type representation): 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
Works council-type representation 0.52 .038*** .036*** .037*** .037*** 0.52 -.025** -.026** -.031** -.026** 
           
Collective agreement type  
(Reference=no collective agreement): 
 
    
    
 
Company level 0.21 .007 .006 .008  0.21 .0005 -.0001 .005  
Higher than company level 0.34 .022* .020 .026*  0.34 -.001 -.003 -.003  
Mixed 0.27 .023* .021* .027*  0.27 .002 .001 .002  
Country-level synthetic indicators:           
Union decentralization    -.008     -.009   
Bargaining centralization     -.005     .021  
Bargaining system 
(Reference=individual bargaining): 
 
   
  
 
  
 
BB_1_company bargaining      .003     .002 
BB_2_coordinated sector bargaining     .016     -.002 
BB_3_uncoordinated sector bargaining      -.003     .017 
BB_4_national bargaining      .019     -.007 
BB_5_governed company and sector 
bargaining 
 
   .012 
 
   .003 
BB_6_ungoverned company and sector 
bargaining  
 
   .013 
 
   .004 
BB_7_governed company and national 
bargaining  
 
   .021 
 
   -.019 
BB_8_ungoverned company and national 
bargaining  
 
   -.042* 
 
   .043* 
BB_9_governed sector and national bargaining     .027     -.013 
BB_10_governed sector and national 
bargaining 
 
   .009 
 
   -.027 
BB_11_governed company, sector and 
national bargaining 
 
   .065** 
 
   -.038 
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BB_12_ungoverned company, sector and 
national bargaining 
 
   .051*** 
 
   -.031 
Number of observations  9,573 9,573 8,972 9,660  9,554 9,554 8,954 8,954 
𝜎𝑢
2  
(s.e.)  
 .272 
(.081) 
.256 
(.078) 
.210 
(.067) 
.254 
(.078) 
 .334 
(.100) 
.320 
(.096) 
.314 
(.101) .333 (.100) 
LR test  305.53 230.27 239.64 215.13  261.26 262.30 218.27 240.38 
 
Table 3 (cont.)  
Outcome indicator 
C: Difficulties in retaining staff 
(Mean: 0.10) 
D: Low motivation of employees  
(Mean: 0.21) 
Variables Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Worker representation 
(Reference= union-type representation): 
 
   
  
    
Works council-type representation 0.52 -.003 .0007 .001 -.002 0.52 -.052*** -.044*** -.041*** -.049*** 
           
Collective agreement type  
(Reference=no collective agreement): 
 
  
 
 
    
 
Company level 0.21 -.003 -.003 -.005  0.21 .003 .004 .003  
Higher than company level 0.35 .010 .012 .016  0.35 .004 .009 .010  
Mixed 0.27 -.013 -.011 -.005  0.27 -.004 -.001 -.001  
Country-level synthetic indicators:           
Union decentralization    .018***     .024***   
Bargaining centralization     -.022***     -.016  
Bargaining system (Reference=individual 
bargaining): 
 
    
   
  
BB_1_company bargaining     -.004     .006 
BB_2_coordinated sector bargaining      .008     -.014 
BB_3_uncoordinated sector bargaining     .035     .022 
BB_4_national bargaining      .009     .001 
BB_5_governed company and sector 
bargaining 
 
   -.006 
  
  -.029 
BB_6_ungoverned company and sector 
bargaining  
 
   .003 
  
  .0006 
BB_7_governed company and national 
bargaining  
 
   
-
.075*** 
   
 -.018 
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BB_8_ungoverned company and national 
bargaining 
 
   .0002 
   
 .024 
BB_9_governed sector and national 
bargaining  
 
   -.019 
   
 -.017 
BB_10_governed sector and national 
bargaining 
 
   .040 
   
 .036 
BB_11_governed company, sector and 
national bargaining  
 
   -.028 
   
 -.061** 
BB_12_ungoverned company, sector and 
national bargaining 
 
   -.026* 
   
 -.015 
Number of observations  9,548 9,548 8,950 9,635  9,456 9,456 8,873 9,541 
𝜎𝑢
2  
(s.e.)  
 .374   
(.114) 
.239 
 (.076) 
.307 
 (.100) 
.362 
(.112) 
 .187 
 (.056) 
.109 
 (.035) 
.191  
(.061) 
.157  
(.051) 
LR test  196.17 134.86 151.13 181.17  229.28 122.15 215.59 119.82 
Note: See notes to Table 1.  
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Table 4. Replication of Table 1 Using the Variables Works council representation only, Union representation only, and Both union and works 
council representation (Marginal Effects) 
Outcome indicator A: Good or very good industrial relations climate  B: High level of sickness/absenteeism 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
(a)       
Union representation only -.045*** -.044*** -.044*** .050*** .050*** .058*** 
Works council representation only -.020*** -.021*** -.024*** .027*** .027*** .029*** 
Both union and works council representation -.046*** -.046*** -.048*** .042*** .043*** .044*** 
(b)       
Union representation only -.045*** -.045*** -.045*** .050*** .051*** .058*** 
Works council representation only -.020*** -.020*** -.023*** .027*** .027*** .029*** 
Both, but where works council representation predominates  -.023* -.023* -.025* .026* .026** .028* 
Both, but where union representation predominates -.056*** -.055*** -.058*** .051*** .052*** .052*** 
 
(Table 4 (cont.)  
Outcome indicator C: Difficulties in retaining staff D: Low motivation of employees  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
(a)       
Union representation only .0003 .0002 -.002 .037*** .036*** .031*** 
Works council representation only .001 .002 .002 .008 .009 .011 
Both union and works council representation .011 .010 .009 .045*** .044*** .040*** 
(b)       
Union representation only .0004 .0003 -.002 .038*** .037*** .032*** 
Works council representation only .001 .002 .002 .006 .008 .010 
Both, but where works council representation predominates  .008 .008 .009 -.013 -.012 -.010 
Both, but where union representation predominates  .012 .011 .009 .067*** .065*** .061*** 
Notes:  The reference category is always the absence of worker representation case. In the interests of economy, the replication is only for columns 
(1) through (3) of Table 1. 
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Table 5. Replication of Table 1 for Five Country Clusters (Marginal Effects) 
Outcome indicator 
A: Good or very good industrial relations climate 
 
B: High level of sickness/absenteeism 
Variables 
Column (1) 
of Table 1 
Germanic 
cluster  
French 
cluster 
 
Anglo-
Saxon 
cluster 
Nordic 
cluster 
East 
European 
transition 
cluster 
Column (1) 
of Table 1 
Germanic 
cluster  
French 
cluster 
 
Anglo-
Saxon 
cluster 
Nordic 
cluster 
East 
European 
transition 
cluster 
Worker representation (Reference=none):             
Works council-type representation  -.020***   -.0228* -.045*** .035 .019 .009 .027*** .048** .046*** -.006 -.002 .0001 
Union-type representation  -.050*** –– -.053***   .019 -.021 -.090***   .051*** –– .077*** .029 .038 .026 
             
Number of observations 20,231 3378 6192 1317 2313 5993 20,205 3370 6184 1317 2310 5986 
Number of countries 28 4 6 2 3 10 28 4 6 2 3 10 
LR test 
Yes 
 
Null not 
rejected 
Yes 
 
Null not 
rejected 
yes yes Yes 
 
yes Yes 
 
Null not 
rejected 
yes yes 
 
 
Table 5 (cont.)  
Outcome indicator C: Difficulties in retaining staff D: Low motivation of employees  
Variables 
Column (1) 
of Table 1 
Germanic 
cluster  
French 
cluster 
 
Anglo-
Saxon 
cluster 
Nordic 
cluster 
East 
European 
transition 
cluster 
Column (1) 
of Table 1 
Germanic 
cluster  
French 
cluster 
 
Anglo-
Saxon 
cluster 
Nordic 
cluster 
East 
European 
transition 
cluster 
Worker representation (Reference=none):             
Works council-type representation  .001 -.004 .023* -.041   -.007 -.009 .003 .036*** .015 .010 -.027 -.046* 
Union-type representation  .005 –– -.002 .027 -.007 -.008 .051*** –– .048*** .032 .007 .067***   
             
Number of observations 20,175      19,979 3348 6123 1303 2303 5873 
Number of countries 28 4 6 2 3 10 28 4 6 2 3 10 
LR test yes yes yes 
Null not 
rejected 
Null not 
rejected yes yes yes yes 
Null not 
rejected yes yes 
Notes: The first column on the left reproduces column (1) of Table 1. The five country clusters are provided in Table 2 of van den Berg et al. 
(2013). Contrary to their Table 2, we include Luxembourg in the Germanic countries cluster given that all respondents from Luxembourg are 
works council representatives. Cyprus, Malta and Croatia are not included in any of the selected clusters. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Appendix Table 1. Variable Definition and Means of Selected Variables, Full MM and Matched MM-ER Samples 
Variable 
Mean 
(MM 
Sample) 
 
Mean 
(MM-ER 
matched 
sample) 
Definition 
Industrial relations performance:    
Strike incidence  N.A. 11 1/0 dummy: 1 if there has been a stoppage or strike in the establishment in the last 12 months  
General work climate (Manager view) 83 79 (IR_quality MM)1/0 dummy: 1 if the general work climate in the establishment is very good or good 
Absenteeism (Manager view) 16 25 1/0 dummy: 1 if there is a high level of sickness leave 
Difficulties in staff retention (Manager view) 11 11 1/0 dummy: 1 if there are difficulties retaining employees 
Low employee motivation (Manager view) 19 23 1/0 dummy: 1 if there is low motivation of employees 
Worker representation/Labor organization:    
Works council-type representation  25 63 1/0 dummy; 1 if a works council or a prevalent works council is present 
Union-type representation  23 37 1/0 dummy: 1 if a union or a prevalent union representation is present. 
Establishment union density  N.A. 44 Union membership at the establishment  
Union-dominated union body N.A. 19 
1/0 dummy: 1 if a union or a prevalent union representation is present and the majority of representatives are 
trade union members 
Union-dominated works council N.A. 26 
1/0 dummy: 1 if a works council or a prevalent works council is present and the majority of representatives are 
trade union members 
Collective agreement:    
No collective agreement 34 16 No collective agreement 
Company level 14 19 Company level 
Higher than company level 33 39 Higher than company level 
Mixed 19 26 Mixed (i.e. company level and higher than company level) 
    
Changes in organization:    
Changes in the remuneration system 32 34 
1/0 dummy: 1 if major changes in the remuneration system were introduced in the past three years. In 2013 the 
variable is defined simply as ‘changes’ in the remuneration system 
Changes in the work process 39 45 
1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in the organization of the work process were introduced in the past three years. In 
2013 the variable is defined as changes in ‘ways to coordinate and allocate the work to employees’ 
Changes in the working time 22 29 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in the working time arrangements were introduced in the past three years 
Restructuring measures 48 55 
1/0 dummy: 1 if restructuring measures were introduced in the past three years. In 2013 the variable is defined 
as changes in the ‘use of technology’ 
Changes in recruitment policies 23 27 1/0 dummy: 1 if changes in recruitment policies 
    
Single establishment 67 53 1/0 dummy: 1 if single independent company or organization 
Private sector 91 85 1/0 dummy: 1 if establishment belongs to the private sector  
Sector:    
Industry 33 37  
Construction 7 9  
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Commerce and hospitality 25 15  
Transport and communication 8 9  
Financial services and real estate 5 10  
Other services 21 20  
Establishment size:    
10 to 49 employees  51 23   
50 to 249 employees  32 52  
More than 250 employees 17 25  
Workforce composition:    
Workers with an OEC 84 85 Percentage of employees who have an open-ended contract (OEC) 
Female workers  39 37 Percentage of employees who are female 
Workers with a university degree 26 25 Percentage of employees who have a university degree 
Part-time workers 14 14 Percentage of employees who work part-time (i.e. less than the usual full-time arrangement) 
Training:    
On- and off-the-job training 
36 44 
Percentage of employees who in the past 12 months received paid time-off from their normal duties to 
undertake training, either off or on the job. 
Performance-based pay:    
HVPBRES 41 43 1/0 dummy: 1 if payment by results, for example piece rates, provisions, brokerages or commissions 
HVPINPER 51 58 1/0 dummy: 1 if variable extra pay linked to the individual performance following management appraisal 
HVPGRPE 33 39 1/0 dummy: 1 if extra pay linked to the performance of the team, working group or department  
HVPPRSH 
38 48 
1/0 dummy: 1 if variable extra pay linked to the results of the company or establishment (profit sharing 
scheme) 
HVPSHOW 8 10 1/0 dummy: 1 if variable extra pay in form of share ownership scheme offered by the company  
Country-level synthetic indicators:    
Union decentralization  
 3.5 2.4 
0-7 scale: 0 is the lowest level of union decentralization. This is the Jansen (2014) scale. The raw variable 
(unauthority) can be downloaded from the ICTWSS database (Visser 2013). 
Bargaining centralization 2.3 2.8 0-5 scale: 0 is the lowest level of centralization. 
Bargaining system: 
(Country- and establishment-based 
classification)    
 
BB_0_individual bargaining 37 19 1/0 dummy: 1 if individual bargaining 
BB_1_company bargaining  18 22 1/0 dummy: 1 if company bargaining  
BB_2_coordinated sector bargaining 10 17 1/0 dummy: 1 if coordinated sector bargaining  
BB_3_uncoordinated sector bargaining 5 3 1/0 dummy: 1 if uncoordinated sector bargaining  
BB_4_national bargaining 9 9 1/0 dummy: 1 if national bargaining 
BB_5_governed company and sector 
bargaining 3 5 
1/0 dummy: 1 if governed company and sector bargaining 
BB_6_ungoverned company and sector 
bargaining 4 5 
1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned company and sector bargaining  
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BB_7_governed company and national 
bargaining 1 1 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed company and national bargaining  
BB_8_ungoverned company and 
national bargaining  3 4 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned company and national bargaining  
BB_9_governed sector and national 
bargaining 2 5 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed sector and national bargaining 
BB_10_governed sector and national 
bargaining 3 2 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned sector and national bargaining  
BB_11_governed company, sector and 
national bargaining 2 4 1/0 dummy: 1 if governed company, sector and national bargaining  
BB_12_ungoverned company, sector 
and national bargaining 3 4 1/0 dummy: 1 if ungoverned company, sector and national bargaining  
Note: Means are given in percentage points.  
 
 
